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Abstract
I re-examine the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation (originally
modeled and tested by Aghion et al. [2005]) by using data from publicly traded manufacturing
￿rms in the US. I control for the possible endogeneity of competition by using various measures
of foreign competition as instruments. I ￿nd a positive relationship between competition (as
measured by the inverse of markups) and innovation (as measured by citation-weighted patents).
The positive relationship is robust to many alternative assumptions and speci￿cations. To rec-
oncile the positive relationship in the US data with the inverted-U relationship that Aghion et al.
[2005] ￿nd in the UK data, I modify their theoretical model and show that the modi￿ed model
can explain both positive and inverted-U relationships. The key theoretical assumption is that
the US manufacturing industries are technologically more neck-and-neck than their counterparts
in the UK. There is some, though not strong, support for this assumption in the data.
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11 Introduction
Schumpeter [1950] averred that perfect competition was not the best market structure and ￿ the
large-scale establishment or unit of control￿was ￿ the most powerful engine￿of progress. Since then,
a large number of theoretical and empirical studies has explored the relationship between market
structure and innovation.1 The Schumpeterian endogenous growth models pioneered by Aghion
and Howitt [1992] formalize Schumpeter￿ s argument. Their original model (see Aghion and Howitt
[1992]) predicts a negative monotone relationship between competition and innovation. The reason
is that if innovation is driven by the expectation of higher pro￿ts then any increase in competition
(that lowers pro￿ts) will reduce innovation. However, empirical works of Nickell [1996], Blundell
et al. [1999], Carlin et al. [2004] and Okada [2005] ￿nd a positive relationship between competition
and productivity (or innovation). In an important and in￿ uential paper, Aghion et al. [2005]
(from here on, ABBGH) attempt to reconcile the Schumpeterian theory with this new evidence.
They develop a simple model in the Schumpeterian tradition and derive an inverted-U relationship
between competition and innovation.2 They test the inverted-U and other related predictions of
their model by using data from publicly listed manufacturing ￿rms in the UK and ￿nd strong
empirical support for their theory.
In this paper, I replicate the empirical work of ABBGH by using a much richer dataset from
publicly listed manufacturing ￿rms in the US. I ￿nd strong evidence for a positive relationship
between competition and innovation in the US data. To reconcile the evidence from the two
datasets, I modify the theoretical model in ABBGH and show that the modi￿ed model can explain
both the inverted-U and the positive relationships. The key assumption behind this result is that
the average technology gap is lower in the country where the relationship is positive. There is some
support in the data for this assumption.
The ￿nding of a positive relationship between competition and innovation is in concordance with
the other studies cited above. The policy implications of the positive relationship are profound and
1See Tirole [1988], chapter 10 sections 10.1 and 10.2, for a brief discussion of the theoretical models and Cohen
and Levin [1989], sections 3.2 and 3.3, for a survey of the empirical studies of the Schumpeterian hypothesis. Kamien
and Schwartz [1982] is a good survey of both theoretical and empirical literature up to the early 1980￿ s. For a more
recent survey see Gilbert [2006].
2The idea of inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation goes at least as far back as Scherer [1967],
who found an inverted-U relationship between market concentration and employment of scientists and engineers. In a
recent paper, Mukoyama [2003] also ￿nds an inverted-U relationship between competition and growth where growth
is driven by innovations.
2di⁄erent from those of the inverted-U. The ￿rst implication is that lower barriers to trade are better
for innovation and growth. This is supported by other recent studies. For example, Bloom et al.
[2011] study the e⁄ects of Chinese import competition on ￿rm performance using a comprehensive
panel dataset covering half a million ￿rms in twelve European countries over the 1996-2007 period.
They ￿nd that Chinese import competition led to increases in R&D, patenting, IT and TFP.
Similarly, Gorodnichenko et al. [2010] study the e⁄ects of globalization on innovation using data
from a uni￿ed survey of over 11,500 ￿rms in 27 emerging markets. They ￿nd that greater pressure
from foreign competition stimulates innovation.
The second implication is that the anti-trust policy should be very strict to promote competition
and patent protection should be less generous to discourage market power. On the ￿rst point,
the antitrust authorities, especially the European Competition Commission, already seem to be
adopting a tougher stance in their anti-trust rulings. The Microsoft Case is a famous example. In
February 2008 the Commission imposed a record penalty payment of 899 million euros on Mocrosoft
for non-compliance with the Commission￿ s earliers rulings. On the second point, there is an ongoing
debate in policy circles on how to best protect the intellectual property without discouraging further
innovation. Boldrin and Levine [2008], for example, take an extreme position on the issue and argue
that there should be no patent protection at all.
Clearly, the kind of broad evidence that this study provides is not su¢ cient to guide the complex
industry-speci￿c trade and anti-trust policies. Nonetheless, together with the evidence from a
broad spectrum of studies with similar conclusions, the message of the present study is that more
competition encourages creativity and innovation.
This paper is related to a large literature in Industrial Organization (IO) on the relationship
between competition and innovation. There are at least three excellent and comprehensive surveys
of this literature: Kamien and Schwartz [1982], Cohen and Levin [1989] and Gilbert [2006]. I
contribute to this literature by providing further evidence of the positive role that competition
plays in promoting innovation. Another contribution of the present study is to provide a coherent
theoretical explanation for the apparently con￿ icting empirical results from the UK and the US
datasets.
This paper, like ABBGH and so many other papers before that, is written in the old IO tradition
of ￿ structure, conduct and performance￿ . The objective is to ￿nd broad-brush evidence on the nature
of the relationship between competition and innovation from cross-industry variation in the data.
3This kind of work is complementary to the new empirical IO studies that focus on a single industry,
estimate structural models and use counter-factual experiments to understand how variations in
market structure a⁄ect innovative activity.3 Examples of the new IO studies on this issue include
Goettler and Gordon [2009] and Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck [2010].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I provide a quick review of the theoretical model
in ABBGH in Section 2. In Section 3, I outline my empirical strategy. I compare my empirical
results with ABBGH￿ s in Section 4. I do a number of robustness checks in Section 5. In Section
6, I attempt to reconcile the apparently con￿ icting empirical evidence from the UK and the US
datasets. I conclude in Section 7. Some details on the construction of empirical variables are in
the appendix.
2 A Quick Review of the Model in ABBGH
In this section I provide a quick review of the theoretical model in ABBGH. The purpose is to set
the stage for the empirical section. I postpone a formal exposition of the model until Section 6.
Consider an economy with a continuum of duopolies. There are two types of duopolies. The
￿rst type are with technologically equal ￿rms. We shall call them Neck-and-Neck (NN) industries.
The second type are with technologically unequal ￿rms: one ￿rm (the leader) is technologically
ahead of the other (the laggard). We shall call them Leader-Laggard (LL) industries. Firms invest
in innovation to improve their chances of getting ahead of their rivals.
As the level of product market competition increases in an industry, there are two opposing
e⁄ects on the level of innovation by the ￿rms. The ￿rst is the Schumpeterian e⁄ect: more competi-
tion reduces pro￿ts and hence there is less incentive to innovate. Due to the Schumpeterian e⁄ect,
more competition reduces innovation. The second is the escape-competition e⁄ect: a ￿rm needs to
innovate to escape competition from the rival since pro￿ts from being a leader are higher than the
pro￿ts from being a neck-and-neck ￿rm. Due to the escape-competition e⁄ect, more competition
increases innovation. The Schumpeterian e⁄ect was present in the original Schumpeterian growth
model of Aghion and Howitt [1992]. The escape-competition e⁄ect is the innovation of ABBGH.
ABBGH show that the escape-competition e⁄ect dominates the Schumpeterian e⁄ect in NN
industries (we shall see this formally in Section 6). Hence in these industries an increase in com-
petition increases innovation. On the other hand, the Schumpeterian e⁄ect dominates the escape-
3Einav and Levin [2010] provide a balanced appraisal of both old and new empirical IO.
4competition e⁄ect in the LL industries. Hence in these industries an increase in competition reduces
innovation.
To derive the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation, ￿rst consider a low
level of competition. If competition is low, ￿rms in NN industries innovate less and hence stay
neck-and-neck. The ￿rms in the LL industries innovate more and the laggards catch up with the
leaders (leaders do not innovate by assumption). This changes the LL industries into NN industries.
The overall e⁄ect is that when competition is low there are more NN industries. Since ￿rms in these
industries innovate less when competition is low, the overall level of innovation in the economy is
low.
Next consider a high level of competition. If competition is high, ￿rms in NN industries innovate
more. This changes the NN industries into LL industries. On the other hand, the ￿rms in LL
industries innovate less and these industries remain LL. Overall when competition is high there are
more LL industries. The ￿rms in these industries innovate less and hence the level of innovation in
the economy is low.
Finally consider an intermediate level of competition. In this situation ￿rms in both LL and
NN industries innovate. In the steady state both type of industries are present and the overall level
of innovation is high.
To sum up, when competition is too low or too high the level of innovation is low. When
competition is in the intermediate range the level of innovation is high. Combining these results,
one gets an inverted-U relationship between product-market competition and innovation. This
gives us the following testable prediction:
Prediction 1 There is an inverted-U relationship between product market competition and inno-
vation. [c.f. Proposition 2, ABBGH p.715]
The above description of the model also implies that when competition is low, most of the
industries are NN in the steady state. As competition increases the fraction of NN industries
declines and that of LL industries increases. In other words, as competition increases, the average
technology gap within industries increases. This gives us the second testable prediction:
Prediction 2 As competition increases, distribution of industries moves from NN to LL and av-
erage technology gap increases. [c.f. Proposition 4, ABBGH p.717]
5Another prediction of the model is that in relatively more NN industries the escape-competition
e⁄ect will be stronger and hence the peak of the inverted-U will be higher. We can state this as
our third testable prediction.
Prediction 3 In more neck-and-neck industries, the peak of inverted-U is higher and occurs at a
higher level of competition. [c.f. Proposition 5, ABBGH p.717]
I test these predictions in Section 4 by using both the UK and the US datasets. But ￿rst I
decribe the US data and my empirical strategy in the next section.
3 Empirical Methodology
I have divided this section into three subsections. In Sub-section 3.1, I describe the US dataset and
compare it with the UK dataset used by ABBGH. In Sub-section 3.2, I present the econometric
model. In Sub-section 3.3, I talk about identi￿cation of the relationships of interest.
3.1 Data
I have compiled the dataset for this study from six sources. The accounting data to construct
the measures of competition and productivity come from the Standard and Poor￿ s COMPUSTAT
database. The patent and citation data to construct the measure of innovation come from NBER￿ s
Patent Database. I use NBER￿ s Productivity database to construct industry-level price indices. I
use CPI statistics from the US Department of Labor. The data on the measures of international
competition that I use as instruments come from Peter Schott￿ s online international trade database.
Finally, the dataset used by ABBGH was sent to me by Rachel Gri¢ th.
There are three key empirical variables used in estimation: competition, innovation and tech-
nology gap. There are two other variables used as instruments. In Appendix A, I describe the
construction of each of these variables. Following ABBGH, I construct industry-level variables
from the original ￿rm-level data. Owing to the much richer US data (there are 7,789 publicly
traded manufacturing ￿rms in my sample compared to 311 in ABBGH￿ s sample), I am able to
work at a more disaggregated level. All the empirical results on the US industries reported in
Section 4 are based on data at the three-digit industry level. Due to the smaller number of ￿rms,
ABBGH worked with two-digit data. However, as I report in Section 5, my main results remain
intact when I aggregate the US data to two-digit level.
6I present a summary comparison of the US data with the UK data used by ABBGH in Table
1. All data are annual. The time coverage of the US dataset is from 1976 to 2001 (26 years).
There are 116 three-digit industries with 2;756 industry-year observations. The UK dataset used
by ABBGH covers the period from 1974 to 1994 (21 years). There are 17 two-digit industries with
354 industry-year observations.
First, consider the statistics on competition. Since competition is de￿ned as one minus the
Lerner￿ s index (see Appendix A for details), a lower level of competition implies higher markups.
By this measure of competition, the US industries, on the average, are less competitive than their
UK counterparts. The average value of competition variable is 0:76 for the US industries compared
to 0:95 for the UK industries. However, this measure of competition is much more dispersed for
the US industries. The standard deviation of competition variable is 0:11 for the US industries and
0:02 for the UK industries. The higher standard deviation in the US data is not because of the
higher level of disaggregation. For example, the standard deviation of the competition variable for
the two-digit US data (not reported in the table) is 0:10, which is still ￿ve times the corresponding
number for the UK data.
Next consider the statistics on citation-weighted patents (CWPs). For this variable the summary
statistics are similar for the two datasets. The average number of CWPs in the US data is slightly
lower than that in the UK data (5:53 versus 6:66), though the standard deviation is slightly higher
(9:98 versus 8:43). There are 13:6% (374 out of 2;756) observations in the US data with zero CWPs
compared to 13:0% (46 out of 354) observations in the UK data.
Finally, consider the statistics on the technology gap. The average technology gap in the two
datasets is the same (i.e. 0:49), though it is slightly more dispersed in the US data (the standard
deviation in the US data is 0:20 versus 0:16 in the UK data).
3.2 Econometric Model
Since the purpose of empirical analysis in this paper is to replicate ABBGH￿ s results using the US
data, I follow ABBGH closely in my empirical methodology except for one modi￿cation: instead
of the Poisson regression model used by ABBGH, I use a Negative Binomial (NB) model.4 This
modi￿cation is motivated by the well-known fact that patents, which I use as the measure of
4See Greene [2003] pp.744-5 and Cameron and Trivedi [1998] pp. 62-5 for some details on the negative binomial
model. The model I use is NB2 in Cameron and Trivedi￿ s terminology.
7innovative activity, generally do not satisfy the Poisson assumption of equal mean and variance.5
The empirical results below support this modi￿cation and the over-dispersion parameter is highly
signi￿cant is almost all speci￿cations. However, the di⁄erent results that I obtain from the US data
are not due to the use of the NB model. The general conclusions are the same with the Poisson
model. I shall say more about this in Section 5.
To test Prediction 1, I proceed as follows. Let xi be the vector of explanatory variables and let
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With these assumptions on the distribution of ￿, the conditional variance of yi is given by
￿i(1 + ￿￿i). Note that if ￿ = 0, the NB model reduces to the standard Poisson model. The
parameter ￿ is also called the over-dispersion parameter. If ￿ is statistically di⁄erent from zero in
the estimated model then the NB regression model provides a better approximation to the data
than the Possion regression model.
The speci￿cation of the conditional mean below is motivated by the hypothesis of an inverted-
U (or more generally, a quadratic) relationship between competition and innovation. Denoting
citation-weighted patents by y, competition by c and the vector of other controls by z, I model the
log of conditional mean as:
ln(yjt) = ￿0 + ￿1cjt + ￿2c2
jt + ￿z + ￿jt: (3)
Under the hypothesis of inverted-U, ￿1 is expected to be positive and ￿2 negative. I estimate
the parameters of the model by using the Maximum Likelihood method.
To test Prediction 2, I regress average technology gap (de￿ned as the average di⁄erence between
the total factor productivity (TFP) of individual ￿rms and the TFP of the industry leader) on
competition.
5The unconditional mean and variance of citation-weighted patents are 5:5 and 99:6 in the US data and 6:7 and
71:1 in the UK data.
8To test Prediction 3, I use the same negative binomial model as the one used to test Prediction 1
above. However, I modify the speci￿cation of conditional mean to allow for the interaction between
competition and technology gap. The conditional mean is now de￿ned as:
ln(yjt) = ￿0 + ￿1cjt + ￿2c2
jt + ￿1(dm ￿ cjt) + ￿2(dm ￿ c2
jt) + ￿z + ￿jt; (4)
where dm is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the average technology gap in the
industry is less than the median technology gap in the data, and 0 otherwise. If the inverted-U
relationship in more neck-and-neck industries is steeper, as implied by Prediction 3, then we would
expect ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 < 0.
To sum up, I use exactly the same econometric model as ABBGH do except for one di⁄erence:
I use the NB model while ABBGH use the Poisson model. This modi￿cation is strongly supported
by both the US and the UK datasets. More importantly, the di⁄erent empirical results that I
obtain for the US data do not depend on my use of the NB model.
3.3 Identi￿cation
The primary source of identi￿cation of the relationship between competition and innovation is
variation in the level of competition across industries and over time. As the summary statistics in
Table 1 suggest, there is a lot more variation in our measure of competition in the US data than
in the UK data. This variation is helpful in identifying the relationship of interest. Indeed, as the
empirical results below show, the parameter estimates are generally more precise with the US data.
However, there are a few important identi￿cation issues that need to be addressed.
Firstly, if both innovation and competition are related to the business cycle or to some other
variable that changes over time, then we might overestimate the relationship between innovation
and competition. For example, suppose that there is no causal relationship between competition and
innovation but both are pro-cyclical. In this case, we shall estimate a spurious positive relationship
between the two variables, although their is no causal relationship between them by assumption.
To overcome this problem, ABBGH use the year ￿xed e⁄ects and I follow suit.
Secondly, di⁄erent industries have di⁄erent propensities to innovate. Hence it is possible to
see a lot of variation in innovative activity across industries that may not be due to variation in
competition. Instead, as noted by ABBGH, it could be the result of the ￿ other institutional features
of the industry￿ . These may include technological opportunities and appropriability conditions in
the industry. Once again following ABBGH, I use industry ￿xed e⁄ects to control for this problem.
9Thirdly and most importantly, there is the issue of the endogeneity of competition. ABBGH
call this problem the ￿ major obstacle to empirical research in this area￿ . If successful innovations
increase market power and hence reduce competition, the estimates will be biased towards ￿nding a
more negative (or less positive) relationship between competition and innovation. ABBGH control
for the endogeneity of competition by using various policy variables as instruments for competition.
The policy variables are correlated with competition but are likely to be uncorrelated with the error
term.
To address the issue of the endogeneity of competition, I use two measures of foreign competition
as instruments for competition.6 The ￿rst measure is the tari⁄rates. If tari⁄s on import substitutes
of the products of a certain industry decline, it is likely to reduce the markups in the industry and
increase competition. The second measure is the freight rates. The idea here is that if freights are
lower for some products (perhaps because they are produced in nearby countries) then the local
producers of those products will face more competition compared to the producers of the products
whose import subsitutes have to be shipped from far o⁄ places and incur higher transportation
costs. Similarly, if the freights decline over time due to improvements in shipment technology,
the competition from foreign products will increase. I show in Section 4 below that both these
measures of foreign competition are correlated with my measure of competition. This satis￿es
the ￿rst (and veri￿able) requirement of good instruments that they should be correlated with the
endogenous variable. To satisfy the second (but unveri￿able) requirement of good instruments, we
need them to be uncorrelated with the error term. To this end, I argue that these measures of
foreign competition are driven by exogenous factors like international trade agreements (in the case
of tarrifs) and improvements in transportation and shipment technology (in the case of freights)
and hence are unlikely to be directly related to industry level innovative activity.
To implement the instrumental variable strategy, I follow ABBGH and add a control function to
the speci￿cations of the conditional mean in (3) and (4). The control function consists of residuals
from the regression of competition on intruments and the time and industry dummies (see equations
(5) and (6) in ABBGH (p. 710) and the related discussion there).
6I also tried a third instrument: import penetration. The idea was that the higher the import penetration in an
industry, the greater will be the level of foreign competition. However, this instrument was not correlated with my
measure of product market competition and hence did not qualify as a strong instrument.
104 Empirical Results
4.1 Prediction 1
Before I compare the empirical results on Prediction 1 from the US data to those from the UK
data, I replicate the results in Table I of ABBGH using the NB model. The purpose is to show that
ABBGH￿ s empirical results on Prediction 1 are very similar whether one uses the Poisson model
or the NB model. I report these results in Table 3. For easy reference, I have reproduced an exact
image of Table I in ABBGH as Table 2. The main conclusion about the inverted-U relationship
between competition and innovation remains unchanged when NB model is used (compare column
(4) in Table 2 with column (4) in Table 3). The use of the NB model is supported by the highly
signi￿cant over-dispersion parameter in three of the four speci￿cations. The only case in which the
over-dispersion parameter is not signi￿cant is when I use 5-year averages of the data. This is not
surprising because ￿ve-year averages smooth out a lot of dispersion in the data. I conclude from
the comparison of Tables 2 and 3 that ABBGH￿ s results on Prediction 1 are robust to the use of
the NB model. Hence, there is strong evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition
and innovation in the UK data regardless of the regression model used.
I report the results on Prediction 1 from the US data in Table 4. There is clear evidence of a
negative relationship between competition and innovation in the ￿rst three speci￿cations. However,
in these speci￿cations I do not control for the possible endogeneity of competition. It is possible
that the negative relationship that I estimate is the result of the fact that more innovation leads
to higher pro￿t margins and hence lowers competition. In the fourth speci￿cation, when I use
the two measures of foreign competition as instruments for competition, this possibility appears to
be supported by the data. The relationship between competition and innovation is now positive.
The two instruments are highly signi￿cant individually as well as jointly (F-Stat = 30:1) in the
reduced form regression of competition on the instruments and the time and industry dummies. It
means that the instruments are strongly correlated with competition. The coe¢ cient on the control
function in the regression is also highly signi￿cant and has a negative sign.
The change in the relationship between competition and innovation from negative to positive
when endogeneity of competition is taken care of is quite remarkable. It suggests that endogeneity
of competition is indeed a serious problem in the US data. When ABBGH control for endogeneity
of competition using various policy instruments, the estimated coe¢ cients on competition and com-
petition squared barely change (compare columns 2 and 4 in Table 2). It suggests that endogeneity
11of competition is not a serious problem in the UK data that ABBGH use.
Another notable feature of Table 4 is that the over-dispersion parameter is highly signi￿cant in
all four speci￿cations. This provides strong support for the use of the NB model.
For a visual comparison of the results from ABBGH￿ s preferred speci￿cation (column (4) in
Table 3) to those from mine (column (4) in Table 4), I plot the estimated citation-weighted patents
from the two speci￿cations against competition in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). I also add the scatter
plot of the raw data in both cases. Figure 1(a) looks very similar to Figure I in ABBGH (p.706),
although the former is based on a NB regression and the latter on a Poisson regression, and shows
an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Figure 1(b), which is based on the
US data, shows a positive relationship.
4.2 Prediction 2
Prediction 2 suggests that as the level of competition increases in an industry, the average technology
gap within the industry should increase. To test this prediction, I run a simple linear regression
of technology gap on competition. The estimates from the ABBGH data are reported in columns
(1) and (2) of Table 6. I shall only comment on results in column (2) because they are based on
a regression that controls for the ￿xed time as well as industry e⁄ects and hence is my preferred
speci￿cation. The coe¢ cient on competition is 0.94 and statistically signi￿cant. This estimate
supports Prediction 2: as product market competition increases, the average technology gap also
increases.
The estimates from the US data are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. Once again
my preferred speci￿cation is the one in column (2). The coe¢ cient on competition is just -0.01 and
is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Hence, there is no evidence of a positive (or negative)
relationship between competition and technology gap in the US data. In other words, the US data
does not support Prediction 2.
I plot the estimated technology gap from the two datasets in Figures 1(c) and 1(d).
4.3 Prediction 3
Prediction 3 suggests that the inverted-U relationship should be steeper in more neck-and-neck
industries. To test this prediction I interact competition and competition squared variables with
a dummay variable that takes the value 1 if the technology gap in the industry is less than the
12median technolgy gap in the data (see (4)). All the following results in this subsection are based
on the same speci￿cation of the conditional mean.
First I estimate the NB model using ABBGH￿ s dataset and compare the results with the original
results in ABBGH based on the Poisson model. For easy reference, I have reproduced an exact
image of Table III (p.719) from ABBGH as Table 5. The results from the NB model using ABBGH￿ s
dataset are in columns (3)-(6) of Table 6. Let us just compare column (4) in Tables 5 and 6. The
results are very similar and provide clear support for Prediction 3. The inverted-U relationship is
steeper in more neck-and-neck (i.e. low-gap) industries.
The results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 are based on the speci￿cations that do not control
for the endogeneity of competition. In columns (5) and (6) I report the results after controlling for
the endogeneity of competition. My preferred speci￿cation is the one in column (6). A comparison
between columns (4) and (6) suggests that the estimates are very similar after we control for the
endogeneity of competition. So the broad conclusion that emerges from the above estimates based
on the ABBGH￿ s dataset is that, as suggested by Prediction 3, the inverted-U relationship is steeper
for more neck-and-neck industries. I depict this in Figure 1(e), where the black line represents the
results for all industries and the red (or grey, if viewed in greyscale) line depicts the results for more
neck-and-neck industries. The estimated inverted-U is higher for more neck-and-neck industries.
In Table 7 columns (3)-(6) I report estimation results based on the US data to test Prediction 3.
I shall only comment on the results in column (6) because they are based on my preferrred speci￿-
cation. Here again we see that after controlling for the ￿xed industry e⁄ects and the endogeneity of
competition, the relationship between competition and innovation is postitive. Moreover, the rela-
tionship is steeper for the more neck-and-neck industries. This result partially supports Prediction
3. Although we do not see the inverted-U relationship in the US data, we do see that the positive
relationship is steeper for more neck-and-neck industries. I plot this result in Figure 1(f), where
again the red (or grey, if viewed in greyscale) line represents the more neck-and-neck industries.
4.4 Summary of Empirical Results
The UK data used by ABBGH support all three theoretical predictions reported in Section 2. The
US data used in this study do not fully support any of the three predictions, though they partially
support Prediction 3. Prediction 1 suggests an inverted-U relationship between competition and
innovation but the US data imply a positive relationship. Prediction 2 suggests a positive relation-
13ship between competition and technology gap but there is no statistically signi￿cant relationship
between the two in the US data. Prediction 3 suggests that the inverted-U should be steeper in
more neck-and-neck industries. The estimates from the US data suggest that although there is
no inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation, the positive relationship that does
exist is indeed steeper for the more neck-and-neck industries. Figure 1 summarizes all these results
graphically.
The two key di⁄erences between the UK and the US datasets that emerge from the above
analysis are the following.
1. The UK dataset suggests an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation
while the US dataset suggests a positive relationship.
2. There is a positive relationship between competition and technology gap in the UK data.
There is no such relationship in the US data.
Do the di⁄erent results from the US data invalidate the theoretical model in ABBGH? Or is
it possible to tweak the model a bit so that it can explain the apparantly con￿ icting results from
the two datasets? I try to answer these questions in Section 6. However, before doing so I test the
robustness of the empirical results from the US data in the next section.
5 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I explore whether my empirical results are robust to a number of alternative empirical
assumptions. I have divided this section into three subsections, one for each prediction.
5.1 Prediction 1
The main conclusion about Prediction 1 from the US data is that there is a positive relationship
between competition and innovation. The empirical results of my preferred speci￿cation to test this
prediction are in column (4) of Table 4. I now explore whether this conclusion is robust to some
alternative empirical assumptions. The alternative empirical assumptions that I explore include
the use of 2-digit data, the use of Poisson regression model, the use of an alternative de￿nition of
competition7, the use of R&D expenditure as the measure of innovation and the use of a ￿ exible
7The benchmark measure of competition is one minus the average of the ￿rm-level Lerner￿ s index within the
industry (see Appendix). If a ￿rm makes a loss, the ￿rm-level Leaner￿ s index could be negative. If there are many
14spline to approximate the relationship. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 8 and
Figure 2. column (1) of Table 8 is the same as column (4) of Table 4. This is the benchmark case.
In column (2) of Table 8, I report the results from 2-digit US data. This is interesting because
ABBGH also use 2-digit level data. The numbers in column (2) show that the positive relationship
is still present and equally strong in the 2-digit level data. In terms of the qualitative comparison,
the only signi￿cant di⁄erence is that when 2-digit data are used, the over-dispersion parameter
is not signi￿cant. This is not surprizing because 2-digit data gloss over a lot of variation that is
present at the 3-digit level.
In column (3) of Table 8, I report the results from a Poisson model. Once again the positive
relationship is highly signi￿cant.
In column (4) of Table 8, I report the results based on an alternative measure of competition.
This is important because while computing the benchmark measure of competition I restrict the
￿rm-level Lerner￿ s index to be non-negative. This restriction lumps together the zero-pro￿t ￿rms
and the loss-making ￿rms. However, if the loss-making ￿rms innovate much less than the zero-pro￿t
￿rms, the restriction may mask lower innovation at very high levels of competition and hence may
hide the negatively sloping part of the inverted-U. However, when I use the alternative measure of
competition, the results barely change and the positive relationship remains strong and statistically
signi￿cant.
In column (5) of Table 8, I report the results based on R&D expenditures as the measure of
innovation. Now the coe¢ cient on competition is negative and on competition squared is positive.
Hence the relationship appears to be U-shaped. However, as I show in Figure 2(a), for most of the
observations (around 95%) the relationship is positive. The negative part of the U-shaped curve is
primarily driven by ￿ve outliers. These are the ￿ve industry-year observations that show very high
level of R&D expenditure at very low levels of competition. Hence, my broad conclusion from this
result is still that there is a positive relationship between competition and innovation. Here, it is
relevant to point out that ABBGH also test the robustness of their results by using R&D as an
alternative measure of innovation. In this case too, they ￿nd an inverted-U relationship, though it
is not statistically signi￿cant.
loss making ￿rms in the industry, this could result in our measure of competition being greater than one, although
theoretically it cannot be greater than one. To avoid this problem, I restrict ￿rm-level Lerner￿ s indices to be non-
negative when computing the benchmark measure of competition. The alternative measure of competition relaxes
this constraint and allows the Lerner￿ s index to be negative.
15Finally, I approximate the relationship between competition and innovation by using a ￿ exi-
ble spline. The ￿tted spline is shown in Figure 2(b). Here again, the evidence for the positive
relationship is quite clear.8
To sum up, the positive relationship between competition and innovation that we ￿nd in the
US data is robust to the alternative empirical assumptions that I have explored in this subsection.
5.2 Prediction 2
The main conclusion about Prediction 2 from the US data is that there is no clear relationship
between competition and average technology gap within the industry. In this subsection, I explore
the robustness of this result to a set of alternative empirical assumptions. The results of this
exercise are in Table 9 and Figure 3. In all the cases, I control for the ￿xed industry and year
e⁄ects. Column (1) in Table 9 is the same as column (2) in Table 7. This is the benchmark case.
The benchmark measure of technology gap is computed by averaging the TFP gap between
the leader and each ￿rm within the industry. In column (2) of Table 9, I report the results based
on an alternative de￿nition of technology gap. This time, the measure of technology gap is based
on labor productivity (LP) di⁄erences between the leader and individual ￿rms. The conclusion is
una⁄ected: there is no clear relationship between competition and technology gap in the US data.
Also note that the constant term in these regressions is highly signi￿cant. This implies that the
technology gap is more or less constant and independent of the level of competition.
In column (3) of Table 9, I report the results based on the alternative measure of competition.9
Once again the conclusion remains the same and we see no clear relationship between competition
and the technology gap.
In column (4) of Table 9, I report the results based on 2-digit level data. Here, the coe¢ cient
on competition is positive and although it is not signi￿cant at 10% level, it is close to be signi￿cant
(the p-value is around 0.11). This statistically weak positive relationship is quantitatively weak too:
a one standard deviation increase in competition leads to a mere 0.09 standard deviation increase
8I also tried some other robustness checks. I do not report their results to save on space. These included: 1)
use of a cubic, instead of a quadratic, model; 2) use of simple patent count as the measure of competition; and
3) restricting the time coverage of the sample to 1976-1994 period to make it similar to the coverage of ABBGH￿ s
sample (1974-1994). The positive relationship between competition and innovation is robust to all these alternative
assumptions.
9Please see Section 5.1 for a description of the alternative measure of competition.
16in the technology gap. I plot this relationship in Figure 3. In fact, if one drops the three outliers
with technology gap less than 0.2, the relationship becomes almost ￿ at.
To sum up, the conclusion about the absence of a clear relationship between competition and
technology gap in the US data is robust to the alternative empirical assumptions that I have tried
in this subsection.
5.3 Prediction 3
The conclusion about Prediction 3 from the US data is that the positive relationship between com-
petition and innovation is steeper in the case of more neck-and-neck industries. In this subsection
I explore the robustness of this conclusion to a set of alternative empirical assumptions. Since it is
easier to compare the slopes of non-linear curves visually, I use graphs to present the results of this
robustness exercise. The results are in Figure 4. The benchmark case, which I do not reproduce
in Figure 4, is in Figure 1(f). In all four panels of Figure 4, the black line represents the results
for all industries and the red (or grey, if viewed in greyscale) line depicts the results for more
neck-and-neck industries.
In Figure 4(a), I report the results from a Poisson model. The positive relationship is steeper
for more neck-and-neck industries. In Figure 4(b), I report the results based on the alternative
de￿nition of competition. Once again, the positive relationship is steeper for more neck-and-neck
industries. In Figure 4(c), I report the results based on R&D as the measure of innovation. Here
the two curves almost coincide. However, a closer look reveals that the positively sloping part of
the red (or grey) curve is slightly steeper than the corresponding part of the black curve, though,
admittedly, the di⁄erence is very small. In Figure 4(d), I report the results based on 2-digit level
data. The two curves, again, look very similar but like the previous case, on closer examination,
on can see that the red (grey) line is slightly steeper.
To sum up, the conclusion that the positive relationship between competition and innovation
in the US data is steeper for more neck-and-neck industries is robust to the alternative empirical
assumptions that I have explored in this subsection.
The general conclusion from the robustness analysis is that the empirical results reported in
Section 4 still hold when we change the empirical model to Poisson, change the dataset to 2-digit
level, modify the measure of competition or use R&D expenditures as the measure of competition.
This conclusion is reassuring and we can have some con￿dence that our empirical results are robust
17and not driven by any particular empirical assumption. In the next section, I try to reconcile the
di⁄erent empirical results that ABBGH and I obtain from the UK and the US datasets.
6 Reconciling the Evidence
To reconcile the apparently di⁄erent empirical results from the US and the UK datasets I proceed as
follows. First, I argue that a partial equilibrium industry model is a better theoretical counterpart to
the data generating process than the general equilibrium model used by ABBGH. Next, I present
the partial equilibrium industry model, which builds on the simple duopoly model in ABBGH.
Finally, I show that the partial equilibrium model provides a simple and intuitive way to reconcile
the evidence from the two datasets.
6.1 Why a Partial Equilibrium Model?
The basic building block of the theoretical model in ABBGH is a simple duopoly model. They then
assume a steady-state and derive the general equilibrium of the model. They de￿ne the steady state
as an invariant distribution of industries by technology gap. There are at least three problems with
their general equilibrium framework that make it less suitable for explaining the empirical results
that we get from a panel of industry-level data.
First, ABBGH assume that the economy is always in the steady state. It implies that when
the level of competition changes exogenously from one period to the next, the economy instantly
adjusts to the new invariant distribution. Note that in ABBGH, for each level of competition there
is a corresponding invariant distribution of industries by technology gap.
Second, to derive the invariant distribution, one needs to assume that the level of competition
is the same across industries. However, the main identifying assumption in the econometric model
used by ABBGH and myself is that the level of product market competition varies exogenously over
time and across industries. Hence the assumption of the same level of competition across industries
imposes an unnecessary restriction on the theoretical model.
Third, the inverted-U relationship that ABBGH derive from their theoretical model is at the
aggregate economy level and not at the industry level (see ABBGH, Proposition 2, p. 715. Es-
pecially note the words ￿aggregate innovation rate￿ ).10 However, what we empirically test is the
10The general equilibrium model in ABBGH can also deliver a positive relationship between competition and
18relationship between competition and innovation at the industry level. In their model, the industry
level relationship is either positive or negative (see ABBGH, Proposition 1, p. 714).
I would like to argue that because of these three problems with the general equilibrium model,
the partial equilibrium version of ABBGH￿ s model is a better theoretical counterpart to the data
generating process. The reason is that the outcomes related to the variables of interest (in this
case: competition, research intensity and technology gap) from the partial equilibrium model map
directly into the industry-level empirical variables that we use in estimation.
However, the partial equilibrium model in ABBGH in its current form can either deliver a
positive or a negative relationship between competition and innovation. This is mainly because of
the assumption that the maximum technology gap between the leader and the laggard can only be
one step. When I relax this assumption, the partial equilibrium model generates richer dynamics
and, depending on the average degree of neck-and-neckness in the industry, can generate a positive,
a negative or an inverted-U relationship.
In what follows, I present a slightly modi￿ed version of the duopoly model in ABBGH. I show
that the equilibrium of the modi￿ed model and the simulations based on it can help us understand
most of the empirical ￿ndings in this paper. The key theoretical assumption is that the industries
in the US are technologically more neck-and-neck than those in the UK.
6.2 The Partial Equilibrium Industry Model
The model is similar to the one in the working paper version of ABBGH (see Aghion et al. [2002])
except for two signi￿cant di⁄erences. First, I focus on the partial equilibrium of an industry and
do not use the assumption of invariant distribution to derive the general equilibrium. Second, I do
not restrict the maximum technology gap between the leader and the laggard to one step. I now
describe the model in some detail.
aggregate economy-wide innovation. The basic condition for this result is that the help parameter (which is ￿xed
in their model) should be large enough. So much so, that even when the level of competition is very high, the
laggards are able to innovate solely because of spillovers from the leaders, although their own R&D e⁄ort may be
zero. This leads to a higher degree of neck-and-neckness in the steady state and generates a positive relationship
between competition and aggregate innovation.
196.2.1 Economic Environment
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where subscripts i and ￿i denote the two ￿rms in the industry. Each ￿rm produces one good.
The parameter ￿ measures the degree of substitutability between the two goods. If ￿ = 1, the
goods are perfect substitutes. In addition to this, ￿ plays another important role in the model:
it is a measure of exogenous competition. If ￿ is higher, the goods are closer substitutes and this
implies higher competition between the ￿rms. The representative consumer allocates her income
between the two goods to maximize utility.
Each ￿rm produces according to a constant returns to scale technology using labor as the only
input and taking the wage rate as given. The supply of labor is assumed to be perfectly elastic.11
qi = AiLi,
where Ai = ￿ki. The parameter ￿ represents the size of innovation and ki is the technology
level of ￿rm i. If ￿rm i is the leader and ￿rm ￿i is the laggard then the technology gap in the
industry is given by
n = ki ￿ k￿i.
In this model, the technology gap is the only state variable. The marginal cost of production
for ￿rm i is given by
ci = w￿￿ki,
where w is the wage rate. Each ￿rm chooses its price to maximize pro￿ts, taking the price of
its rival as given (Bertrand Equilibrium). The problem of the ￿rm is:
max
pijp￿i
￿i = (pi ￿ ci)qi (pi;p￿i).
Innovation depends on research intensity x 2 [0;1). If x units of labor are devoted to R&D,
the probability of a successful innovation is given by Pr(x(n);n) 2 [0;1]. Let V (n) denote the
11This assumption is made for convenience only. We only need that the ￿rms take the wage rate as given. The
assumption of perfectly elastic labor makes the wage rate constant over time.
20value of the ￿rm that is n steps ahead of its rival (n could be negative). The Bellman equation for
the ￿rm is given by:
V (n) = max
x(n)jx(￿n)
f￿ (n) ￿ wx(n) + ￿ [Pr(x(n);n)[1 ￿ Pr(x(￿n);￿n)]V (n + 1)+
[1 ￿ Pr(x(n);n)]Pr(x(￿n);￿n)V (n ￿ 1)+
Pr(x(n);n)Pr(x(￿n);￿n)V (n)+
[1 ￿ Pr(x(n);n)][1 ￿ Pr(x(￿n);￿n)]V (n)]g.
(5)
The ￿rm chooses it research intensity x(n) by taking the research intensity of its rival x(￿n) as
given. The period pro￿t function is given by ￿ (n). Since there are two ￿rms and two possible out-
comes of innovation for each, in total there are four possibilities: (1) If the ￿rm succeeds in innovat-
ing and its rival does not, an event that occurs with probability [Pr(x(n);n)[1 ￿ Pr(x(￿n);￿n)],
the technology gap will increase from n to n + 1; (2) If the ￿rm does not succeed and its rival
does, an event that occurs with probability [1 ￿ Pr(x(n);n)]Pr(x(￿n);￿n), the technology gap
will decrease from n to n ￿ 1; (3) If both ￿rms succeed, an event that occurs with probability
Pr(x(n);n)Pr(x(￿n);￿n), the technolgy gap will remain unchanged at n; and (4) if both ￿rms
do not succeed, an event that occurs with probability [1 ￿ Pr(x(n);n)][1 ￿ Pr(x(￿n);￿n)], the
technology gap will again remain unchanged at n.
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i
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where a > 0 and ￿ > 0 are parameters, x is the research intensity and ^ n ￿ 0 is a technology
gap threshold explained below. There are two components of the right-hand side of (6). The
￿rst component, [1 ￿ e￿ax], is the probability of a successful innovation based on a ￿rm￿ s own re-
search e⁄ort. Parameter a measures the productivity of the R&D e⁄ort. The second component,
max
￿
0;1 ￿ e￿(n￿^ n)￿
, is the additional probability of success that a laggard enjoys because of knowl-
edge spillovers from the leader. This is similar to the help parameter h in ABBGH. The di⁄erence
is that I make it a function of technology gap: the further behind the laggard is, the easier it is for
him to move one step ahead by immitating the leader.12 This assumption is important to avoid
divergence between the ￿rms in forward simulations. Without this assumption, the technology gap
in the industry continues to increase until it is so high that the innovation incentives for both the
12Goettler and Gordon [2009] make a similar assumption in their study of competition and innovation in the
microchip industry.
21￿rms are zero. With this assumption, the technology gap remains low because it is easier for the
laggard to catch up. Parameter ￿ is the help parameter. Note that if n ￿ 0, i.e. the ￿rm is either
neck-and-neck with its rival or the leader, then the help component is zero. That means the help is
only available to the laggards. However, if ^ n < 0, the help is only available to the laggards whose
gap from the leader is more than ￿^ n steps. To see this more clearly, assume that ^ n = ￿3. Then
the help component is positive only if n ￿ ￿4. The idea is that the spillovers are only helpful for
the laggards who are some distance behind the leader. This assumption helps in keeping the inno-
vation incentives of neck-and-neck ￿rms high. The reason is that if a laggard can bene￿t from the
leader even if the former is just one step behind, it will discourage innovation by the neck-and-neck
￿rms because if they are successful in their innovation, their rival will immediately bene￿t from
the spillovers. We need to keep the innovation incentives of neck-and-neck ￿rms high because it
is crucial for reconciling the evidence from the US and the UK datasets. I comment more on this
point below.
6.2.2 Equilibrium
Given the parameters of the model (￿;a;￿;￿;￿; ^ n;w;N), where N < 1 is an arbitrarily large
positive number that represents the maximum allowable technology gap, the industry equilib-








, a pro￿t sequence
f￿ (n)g
N
n=￿N, research intensities fx(n)g
N
n=￿N and ￿rm values fV (n)g
N
n=￿N such that:
1. the relative quantity
qi




2. the relative price
pi
p￿i (n) maximizes ￿rms￿pro￿ts when the ￿rms take the relative quantity
qi
q￿i (n) as given and the equilibrium pro￿ts are given by f￿ (n)g
N
n=￿N.
3. Each ￿rm chooses its research intensity to maximize its value, taking the research intensity of
its rival as given. The solution to this problem generates equilibrium strategies fx(n)g
N
n=￿N
and the corresponding equilibrium values fV (n)g
N
n=￿N.
226.2.3 Solving the Model
Normalizing the total expenditure on the two goods to one, we can solve the representative con-
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￿i (n). Given the equilibrium price ratio,
the equilibrium pro￿t is
￿ (n) =
(1 ￿ ￿)Ri (n)
1 ￿ ￿Ri (n)
,












In order to solve for equilibrium strategies fx(n)g
N
n=￿N and the corresponding equilibrium
values fV (n)g
N
n=￿N we need to solve the dynamic program in (5). The speci￿c form of Pr(x(n);n)
assumed in (6) greatly simpli￿es the problem because given the value function, one can solve
explicitly for the equilibrium strategies. To see this, note that the ￿rst order condition for x(n),








b(n) = [1 ￿ Pr(x(￿n);￿n)][V (n + 1) ￿ V (n)] + Pr(x(￿n);￿n)[V (n) ￿ V (n ￿ 1)].
Using (6), we get the following closed form solution for x(n)
x(n) = ln(a￿b(n)=w)=a.
This policy function is based on an arbitrary value function. To ￿nd the equilibrium value
function we start from an arbitrary value function and iterate on it using the Bellman equation.
Once we have the equilibrium value function, we can use the last equation to ￿nd the corresponding
equilibrium policy function.
There is no closed-form solution for the relative price ratio or the equilibrium value and policy
functions. Hence we need to solve the model numerically. Given the simple structure of the model,
the numerical solution is computationally very light and can be found in just a few seconds.
6.3 Using the Partial Equilibrium Model to Reconcile the Evidence
We need to specify the parameter values before we can ￿nd the numerical solution to the model
and use it to examine the relationships of interest. There are eight parameters in the model.
1. ￿: This is the substitutability parameter and also serves as the exogenous measure of com-
petition. It can take values between 0 and 1. I solve the model for various values of ￿ in this
range.
2. a: This is R&D productivity paramter. I set a = 5.
3. ￿: This is the discount factor. I assume the time period to be one year and set ￿ = 0:95.
4. ￿: This is the help parameter. I set ￿ = 0:2.
5. ￿: This is the innovation size. I assume ￿ = 1:1. It means that a one-step increase in the
technology gap reduces the relative marginal cost of the leader by approximately 10%.
6. ^ n: I use two value for this parameter: ￿1 and ￿2. The value of ￿1 implies more neck-
and-neck environment and is meant to represent the US economy and ￿2 implies slightly
less neck-and-neck environment and is meant to represent the UK economy. This is the only
parameter that I allow to di⁄er between the two countries.
247. w: This is the wage rate. I set w = 0:1.
8. N: This is the maximum allowable technology gap between the leader and the laggard. I set
N = 100. The maximum gap is large enough to ensure that in equilibrium both the leader
and the laggard have almost no incentive to innovate if the gap between them is close to the
maximum.
The values for a, ￿, ￿ and w are arbitrary. However, the qualitative results are not sensitive to
changes in these paramters. Here my purpose is not to take a stand on any particular parameter
value. Instead, it is to show that the model can reconcile most of the empirical results for a certain
set of parameter values.
I solve the model numerically using the above parameter values. In Section 6.3.1, I examine the
equilibrium solution of the model to see how much of the empirical evidence that we have seen so
far it can explain. I ￿nd that the equilibrium of the model can reconcile the empirical evidence on
Predictions 1 and 3. However, we need to forward simulate the model to see its implications for
Prediction 2. In Section 6.3.2, I present the simulation results. I use them to reconcile evidence
from the UK and the US datasets on all three predictions. The key result is that when I restrict the
technology gap to very low levels in the simulations for the US industries, the model can explain
almost all the empirical results in this paper.
6.3.1 Results from Equilibrium of the Model
I plot equilibrium innovation intensity against competition for six di⁄erent values of technology gap
in Figure 5. It is immediately clear that for very small technology gap the equilibrium relationship
is positive (see panels (a) and (b)). As the technology gap increases, the relationship resembles an
inverted-U (see panels (c) and (d)). And for very large technology gap the relationship is negative
(see panel (e)). Another important feature of the equilibrium is that the innovation intensity
is generally higher in low gap industries. These ￿ndings can reconcile some of the con￿ icting
empirical evidence from the UK and the US datasets. In the empirical section, we saw that the
relationship between competition and innovation was inverted-U in the UK data and positive in the
US data. The equilibrium of the model suggests that if the manufacturing industries in the US are
more neck and neck than those in the UK, then the model can explain why we see an inverted-U
relationship in the UK and a positive relationship in the US. The equilibrium also helps us reconcile
the empirical results for Prediction 3. We see in Figure 5 that more neck-and-neck industries tend
25to innovate more. The mechanism behind both these results is the same as explained by ABBGH: as
technology gap narrows, the escape competition e⁄ect becomes stronger and eventually dominates
the Schumpeterian e⁄ect.
Figure 5 can also be used to understand the theoretical ￿ndings in ABBGH. They show that
in neck-and-neck industries the relationship is positive. We see that is panels (a) and (b). They
also show that in unlevelled industries the relationship is negative. We see that in Panel (e). Since
ABBGH restriced the maximum technology gap to one, they do not get the inverted-U relationship
shown in panels (c) and (d). This also explains why they use the assumption of the invariant
distribution. They do so because it enables them to show a nice inverted-U relationship at the
aggregate level. However, by relaxing their assumption of the maximum technology gap of one
step, I am able to get the inverted-U relationship at the industry level from the partial equilibrium
model. Hence I do not need to impose the restrictive assumption of the invariant distribution of
industries by technology gap.
The results in Figure 5 do not tell us any thing about the relationship between competition
and technology gap. This is because we ￿x the level of competition and then solve the model for
equilibrium innovation intensity at various levels of technology gap (see the de￿nition of equilibrium
in Section 6.2.2). To study the relationship between competition and technology gap using the
partial equilibrium model, we need to simulate the model.
6.3.2 Results from Simulations of the Model
For simulation purposes, I assume that competition follows an exogenous process. In fact, in both
the UK and the US datasets, AR(1) processes approximate the evolution of competition very well.
I estimate the AR(1) processes from the two datasets and use them in simulations below.
For each simulation, in the initial period (period 0) I start from an arbitray combination of
competition (￿0) and technology gap (n0). Given the (￿0;n0) combination, I use the equilibirum
solution to ￿nd the equilibrium research intensity of both ￿rms [x(n0);x(￿n0)]. These research
intensities together with (6) give the equilibrium probabilities of successful innovation. Based
on these probabilities, I draw from a [0;1] uniform distribution to determine the ourcomes of
research activity. Based on the outcomes, I update the technology gap to n1. I then use the
estimated AR(1) process to get ￿1. I use this updated combination (￿1;n1) and repeat the above
26calculations for period 1. I repeat this process for 10;000 periods.13 For each simulation period
￿ 2 f0;1;2;￿￿￿ ;10000g, I record the level of competition (￿￿), technology gap (n￿) and the sum
of the equilibrium research intensities [x(n￿) + x(￿n￿)]. These simulations are repeated 100 times
for each country. The only important di⁄erence between the simulations for the two countries is
that when I simulate the UK economy, I use the solution of the model with ^ n = ￿2 and when I
simulate the US economy I use the solution based on ^ n = ￿1.14 One hundred simulations of 10;000
periods each give one million observations on competition, technology gap and innovation for each
country. I use these simulated data to run linear or quadratic regressions and report the results
in Figure 6. Figure 6 is the theoretical counterpart of Figure 1. I shall compare the two ￿gures
panel-by-panel.
Figure 6(a) shows a nice inverted-U relationship. This is meant to theoretically explain the
inverted-U relationship that we observe in the UK data (see Figure 1(a)).
Figure 6(b) is meant to replicate the positive relationship that we observe in the US data (see
Figure 1(b)). Here although the relationship is mostly positive, at very high levels of competition,
it turns negative. This is because in the simulated industries the average technology gap is 3:21
and hence the ￿rms are not always in a neck-and-neck situation. Still the relationship in Figure
6(b) is more positive and less inverted-U compated to Figure 6(a). Hence the simulated model does
explain that if technology gap is small, the relationship between competition and innovation tends
to be more positive.
In Figure 6(c), we see a positive relationship between competition and technology gap. This
replicates the observed relationship for the UK data very well (see Figure 1(c)).
In Figure 6(d), again we see a positive relationship between competition and technology gap.
This contrasts with what we see in the US data (see Figure 1(d)). In the US data, there is no
relationship between competition and technology gap. The theoretical model is unable to match
this observation. However, the theoretical relationship is quantitatively weak: a one standard
deviation (SD) increase in competition leads to a mere 0:16 SD increase in the technology gap. It
could be that there are some other factors at work in the US economy that we do not capture in
13The number of periods was chosen to be 10,000 because it is large enough to ensure that the arbitrarily chosen
initial values of ￿ and n have no e⁄ect on simulation results.
14For each country, I use a separate AR(1) process for ￿. The AR(1) processes are estimated from the two datasets.
However, this di⁄erence is not important. Even if I use the same AR(1) process for both countries, the results are
very similar.
27our model. One possibility is that when competition increases, technologically weaker ￿rms leave
the industry and are replaced by relatively stronger ￿rms. This will reduce the average technology
gap in the industry and hence ￿ atten the relationship. However, since our model does not feature
entry or exit, we do not capture this characteristic of the US economy.
Figure 6(e) is meant to replicate the empirical results from the UK data on Prediction 3 (see
Figure 1(e)). The red (grey, if viewed in greyscale) line represents the industries with technology gap
less than the median and the black line represents the remaining industries. The simulation results
replicate the empirical results from the UK data: the inverted-U is steeper for more neck-and-neck
industries.
Figure 6(f) is meant to replicate the empirical results from the US data on Prediction 3 (see
Figure 1(f)). Once again, the red (grey, if viewed in greyscale) line represents the industries with
technology gap less than the median and the black line represents the remaining industries. The
simulation results show that at low levels of competition the neck-and-neck industries innovate
slightly less. This is inconsistent with the empirical results from the US data. However, at high
levels of competition the simulation results replicate the empirical results from the US data.
To wrap up, the ￿rst simulation results shown in Figure 6 replicate the empirical results from
the UK data very well. This is evident when one compares the simulation results in panels (a), (c)
and (e) of Figure 6 with the empirical results in the corresponding panels in Figure 1. However,
the simulation results only partially replicate the empirical results from the US data. When we
compare the simulation results in panels (b), (d) and (f) of Figure 6 with the empirical results in
the corresponding panels in Figure 1, we see that simulation results partially replicate the results
in panels (b) and (f) but do not replicate the results in panel (d).
The key insight from the equilibrium of the model and the simulation results is that in more
neck-and-neck industries the relationship between competition and innovation is positive. However,
in the simulation results that are meant to replicate the US results, the endogenously evolving
technology gap has a mean value of 3.21. Intuitively, if we could restrict the technology gap to a
lower level, our simulated results would better replicate the US data. I do so in Figure 7. The
only di⁄erence between Figures 6 and 7 is that in panels (b), (d) and (f) of the latter, I restrict
the technology gap to a maximum of two steps. Now the simulation results replicate the empirical
results from the US data very well. To see this compare panels (b), (d) and (f) of Figure 7 with
the corresponding panels of Figure 1:
28To sum up, the simulation results from the partial equilibrium industry model can replicate
empirical results from both the UK and the US datasets if we assume that the manufacturing
industries in the US are, on the average, more neck-and-neck than their counterparts in the UK.
The assumption that the US industries are more neck and than the UK industries ￿nds some
support in the data. For example, the median technology gap in the US is 0:48 compared to 0:51
in the UK (see Table 1). The di⁄erence is even higher between the 10th percentile industries: 0:23
in the US compared to 0:28 in the UK. So the industries with less than median technology gap in
the US are more neck and neck than the similar industries in the UK. If we use labor productivity
instead of TFP to compute the technology gap then the US industries appear to be even more neck
and neck: the mean gap is 0:47, the median is 0:45 and the 10th percentile is 0:20.
7 Concluding Remarks
I have shown that the relationship between competition and innovation is positive in the US data.
This is in contrast with the empirical results in ABBGH who ￿nd an inverted-U relationship in the
UK data. Building on the duopoly model in ABBGH, I show that a partial equilibrium industry
model can explain these con￿ icting results if one assumes that the US manufacturing industries are
technologically more neck and neck than their UK counterparts. There is some support for this
assumption in the data.
If one agrees with these ￿ndings then a natural question is: why the US industries are more
neck-and-neck than the UK industries? Although I do not have a de￿nitive answer to this question,
I would o⁄er some possible candidates. One possibility is the legal institutions. If bankruptcy laws
are more lenient in the US then the weaker ￿rms are more likely to quit and the remaining ￿rms
will be more neck-and-neck. Another possibility is the more e¢ cient allocation of resources between
￿rms. A recent body of literature (see Hsieh and Klenow [2009], for example) uses dispersion in
TFP as a measure of allocative e¢ ciency. If TFP dispersion is lower in the US, it could be because
the allocative e¢ ciency is higher.
The last point leads to another important policy implication of the results in this paper. If
a higher degree of neck-and-neckness leads to a more positive relationship between competition
and innovation then any policy to reduce the allocative ine¢ ciency will also promote innovation
and hence growth. So in the cases of India and China that Hsieh and Klenow [2009] examine,
if governments take steps to promote allocative e¢ ciency, a byproduct of these policies will be a
29market driven increase in research activity. This may already be happening. The World Intellectual
Property Organization reports in a recent press release that the international patent ￿lings (under
WIPO￿ s Patent Cooperation Treaty) by China had increased by a whopping 313% in just four years
from 2006 to 2010. Growth in Indian ￿lings was 33% over the same period. Although this is just
one-tent of the gorwth in the Chinese ￿lings, it is still four times the global growth in ￿lings, which
was 8:9%, over the same period.15
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31A Data
In this appendix, I brie￿ y describe the construction of the key empirical variables used in estimation.
1. Competition
Following ABBGH (see equation (1) on page 705 of ABBGH), the competition variable is de￿ned
as one minus the average Lerner￿ s index of individual ￿rms in the industry. Speci￿cally






where j denotes the industry and i denotes a ￿rm in the industry. The Lerner￿ s index is computed
in the same way as in ABBGH (see footnote 7, p 704 in ABBGH):
Lit =
operating pro￿t ￿ ￿nancial cost
sales
:
The ￿rm-level data are from Standard and Poor￿ s COMPUSTAT database. To compute real
quantities I use industry-level price indexes from NBER￿ s productivity database.
2. Citation-weighted patents
Citation-weighted patents are computed using patent and citation data from the New NBER
Patent Data Project. These data are available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject
(last accessed on November 16, 2010). To match the patent data to the ￿rm-level accounting data
from COMPUSTAT I use the unique gvkey assigned to each ￿rm in both datasets.
3. Technology gap






The TFP (total factor productivity) is computed as (y=L)=(k=L)￿, where y represents real sales
multiplied by value-added to sales ratio for the industry, k capital stock and L number of employees.
I use ￿ equal to 1=3. This measure of TFP is highly correlated with NBER￿ s ￿ve-factor productivity.
The correlation between the two (at the four-digit level) is 0:88. This is despite the fact that the
sample used to compute NBER productivity measures is not the same as the COMPUSTAT sample
used in this study. If one computes TFP by applying the above de￿nition to NBER￿ s dataset, the
resulting TFP series has a correlation coe¢ ceint of 0:94 with NBER￿ s ￿ve-factor productivity.
4. Instruments
I use two instruments for competition. The ￿rst instrument is import-weighted average tar-
i⁄ rate, where the tari⁄ rate is de￿ned as: duties/(customs value). The second instrument is
import-weighted freight rate, where the freight rate is de￿ned as: cif/fob - 1. The acronym cif
stands for cost, insurance and freight and the acronym fob stands for free on board. The data
for these instruments are from Peter Schott￿ s online database. These data are publicly available
at http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm (last accessed on November 16,
2010).
32Table 1: A Summary Comparison of US and ABBGH Datasets
US Data ABBGH Data
(three-digit) (two-digit)



















No. of Industries 116 17
Time Period 1976-2001 1974-94
Observations 2756 354
33Table 2: An Exact Image of Table I of ABBGH (p.708)
substantially smaller sample,
10 the coefﬁcients are not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Finally, we ﬁt the relationship for each of the top
four innovating industries in our sample, and in each case there
is part or all of an inverted-U shape (see the earlier working
paper version of this paper [Aghion et al. 2004]).
II.D. Using Policy Instruments
The major obstacle to empirical research in this area is that
competition and innovation are mutually endogenous. Without
addressing this, any results we ﬁnd are likely to be biased toward
10. In the United Kingdom R&D was not a mandatory reporting item prior to
1990, so it is not available for the majority of ﬁrms prior to this date. This is one
of the reasons we use citation-weighted patents as our main innovation indicator.
TABLE I
EXPONENTIAL QUADRATIC:B ASIC SPECIFICATION
Dependent variable: citation-
weighted patents (1) (2) (3) (4)
Data frequency Annual Annual
5-year
averages Annual
Competitionjt 152.80 387.46 819.44 385.13






(29.61) (36.17) (141.43) (36.06)
Signiﬁcance of: Competitionjt,
Competition squaredjt
7.60 38.34 9.97 32.59
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)








Control functions in regression 4.38
(4.04)
R
2 of reduced form 0.801
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 354 354 67 354
Competitionjt is measured by (1-Lerner index) in the industry-year. All columns are estimated using an
unbalanced panel of seventeen industries over the period 1973 to 1994. Estimates are from a Poisson
regression. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. The standard errors in column (4) have not been
corrected for the inclusion of the control function. Signiﬁcance tests show likelihood ratio test-statistics and
P-value from the F-test of joint signiﬁcance. The fourth column includes a control function. The excluded
variables are policy instruments speciﬁed in Table II, imports over value-added in the same industry-year,
TFP in the same industry-year, output minus variable costs over output in the same industry-year and
estimates of markups from industry-country regression [Martins et al. 1996] interacted with time trend, all
for the United States and France.
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34Table 3: Replication of Table I of ABBGH using ABBGH Data and Negative-Binomial Model
Dependent Variable:
Citation-weighted Patents (1) (2) (3) (4)
Data frequency Annual Annual 5-yr avg Annual
cjt (competition) 174:41 405:45 623:17 409:21
(200:85) (92:37) (257:94) (92:11)
c2
jt (competition squared) ￿91:86 ￿214:34 ￿331:48 ￿218:04
(106:58) (49:39) (137:46) (49:33)
Joint signi￿cance (cjt, c2
jt) 0:87 22:58 5:88 19:96
(0:65) (0:00) (0:05) (0:00)
Signi￿cance of political instruments 3:70
in reduced form (0:00)
Signi￿cance of other instruments 4:53
in reduced form (0:00)
Sig. of over-dispersion parameter 2128:49 43:01 1:3e ￿ 5 42:72
(0:00) (0:00) (0:49) (0:00)
Control function in regression 5:53
(4:90)
R2 of the reduced form 0:82
Year e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Industry e⁄ects no yes yes yes
Observations 354 354 67 354
35Table 4: Replication of Table I of ABBGH using US Data and Negative-Binomial Model
Dependent variable:
Citation-weighted patents (1) (2) (3) (4)
Data frequency Annual Annual 5-yr avg Annual
cjt (competition) ￿13:46 ￿7:81 ￿7:85 3:95
(2:17) (1:22) (2:49) (2:63)
c2
jt (competition squared) 8:70 4:64 4:64 4:02
(1:48) (0:86) (1:80) (0:85)
Joint signi￿cance (cjt, c2
jt) 42:39 78:94 21:59 48:17
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Signi￿cance of instruments 30:06
in reduced form (0:00)
Sig. of over-dispersion parameter 2:1e + 4 877:31 21:59 808:07
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Control function in regression ￿10:96
(2:19)
R2 of the reduced form 0:68
Year e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
Industry e⁄ects no yes yes yes
Observations 2756 2756 548 2756
36Table 5: An Exact Image of Table III of ABBGH (p.719)
Two features stand out clearly. First, more neck-and-neck in-
dustries show a higher level of innovation activity for any level
of product market competition. Second, the inverted-U curve is
steeper for the more neck-and-neck industries, which accords
well with our theoretical predictions. These differences are
statistically signiﬁcant, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table
II, which reports the quadratic coefﬁcients for the whole sam-
ple and the high neck-and-neck industry subsample including
a full set of year dummies (third column) and a full set of year
and industry dummies (fourth column). The interaction terms
are jointly signiﬁcant in both cases.
TABLE III
TECHNOLOGY GAP AND EXPONENTIAL QUADRATIC WITH NECK-AND-NECK SPLIT
















Competitionjt 2.858 0.942 183.81 424.46





Competitionjt  Technology 1.43 3.82
gapjt (2.48) (2.66)
Competition squaredjt  
1.30 
3.84
Technology gapjt (2.59) (2.78)
Signiﬁcance of:
Competitionjt, 16.59 39.21








Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes
Competitionjt is measured by (1-Lerner index) in the industry-year. Technology gapjt is measured by the
average distance to the TFP frontier ﬁrm across all ﬁrms in the industry-year, so it is an inverse measure of
neck-and-neckness. All columns estimated using an unbalanced panel of 354 yearly observations on seven-
teen industries over the period 1973 to 1994. Signiﬁcance tests show likelihood ratio test-statistics and
P-value from the F-test of joint signiﬁcance. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. The standard errors
in columns 3 and 4 have not been corrected for the inclusion of the control function.
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37Table 6: Replication of Table III of ABBGH using ABBGH Data and Negative-Binomial Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Technology Technology Citation- Citation- Citation- Citation-
gap gap weighted weighted weighted weighted
patents patents patents patents
Estimation Procedure: Linear Linear Negative Negative Negative Negative
regression regression Binomial Binomial Binomial Binomial
cjt (competition) 2:86 0:94 204:43 441:03 184:38 454:00
(0:40) (0:41) (215:13) (94:76) (217:53) (94:73)
c2
jt (competition squared) ￿106:67 ￿231:52 ￿96:13 ￿240:17
(113:04) (50:26) (114:31) (50:37)
cjt ￿ dm (competition ￿ 1:60 4:28 3:17 5:45
low gap dummy) (8:50) (3:78) (8:84) (3:85)
c2
jt ￿ dm (competition squared ￿1:46 ￿4:34 ￿3:13 ￿5:55
￿ low gap dummy) (8:90) (3:95) (9:27) (4:02)
Joint signi￿cance (cjt, c2
jt) 0:94 22:73 0:76 23:12
(0:63) (0:00) (0:68) (0:00)
Joint signi￿cance (cjt ￿ dm, 1:43 3:16 1:26 4:13
c2
jt ￿ dm) (0:49) (0:21) (0:53) (0:13)
Sig. of over-dispersion 2113:14 38:06 2111:96 37:51
parameter (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Control function in regression 6:38 7:35
(10:13) (4:94)
Year e⁄ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry e⁄ects no yes no yes no yes
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354
38Table 7: Replication of Table III of ABBGH using US Data and Negative-Binomial Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Technology Technology Citation- Citation- Citation- Citation-
gap gap weighted weighted weighted weighted
patents patents patents patents
Estimation Procedure: Linear Linear Negative Negative Negative Negative
regression regression Binomial Binomial Binomial Binomial
cjt (competition) ￿0:30 ￿0:01 ￿8:65 ￿4:98 ￿6:80 3:66
(0:04) (0:04) (2:09) (1:25) (2:18) (2:59)
c2
jt (competition squared) 5:18 2:17 4:47 1:92
(1:45) (0:91) (1:49) (0:90)
cjt ￿ dm (competition ￿ ￿4:66 ￿2:18 ￿4:81 ￿1:99
low gap dummy) (0:65) (0:39) (0:65) (0:39)
c2
jt ￿ dm (competition squared 4:93 3:02 5:05 2:76
￿ low gap dummy) (0:82) (0:48) (0:81) (0:48)
Joint signi￿cance (cjt, c2
jt) 28:76 112:72 9:77 13:67
(0:00) (0:00) (0:01) (0:00)
Joint signi￿cance (cjt ￿ dm, 129:49 60:68 141:33 49:40
c2
jt ￿ dm) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Sig. of over-dispersion 2:0e + 4 708:92 2:0e + 4 673:98
parameter (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Control function in regression ￿1:99 ￿8:28
(0:53) (2:18)
Year e⁄ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry e⁄ects no yes no yes no yes
Observations 2756 2756 2756 2756 2756 2756
39Table 8: Robustness Analysis: Prediction 1
Dependent variable: CWP CWP CWP CWP R&D
De￿nition of Competition: Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Alternative Benchmark
Regression Model: NB NB Poisson NB 2SLS
Data Type: 3-digit 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cjt (competition) 3:95 4:99 10:31 5:38 ￿609:13
(2:63) (7:65) (1:74) (2:15) (167:93)
c2
jt (competition squared) 4:02 15:01 2:24 2:52 503:65
(0:85) (2:18) (0:42) (0:53) (109:54)
Joint signi￿cance (cjt, c2
jt) 48:17 98:36 118:38 46:16 17:46
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Signi￿cance of instruments 30:06 4:42 30:06 23:11 30:06
in reduced form (0:00) (0:01) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Sig. of over-dispersion parameter 808:07 0:00 - 799:93 -
(0:00) (0:50) - (0:00) -
Control function in regression ￿10:96 ￿31:68 ￿15:04 ￿10:40 -
(2:19) (5:95) (1:56) (1:96) -
R2 of the reduced form 0:68 0:77 0:68 0:62 0:68
Observations 2756 519 2756 2756 2756
40Table 9: Robustness Analysis: Prediction 2
Dependent variable: Tech Gap Tech Gap Tech Gap Tech Gap
(TFP) (LP) (TFP) (TFP)
De￿nition of Competition: Benchmark Benchmark Alternative Benchmark
Data Type: 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 2-digit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cjt (competition) ￿0:01 ￿0:02 ￿0:002 0:13
(0:04) (0:04) (0:03) (0:08)
Constant 0:44 0:44 0:44 0:75
(0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:06)
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(f) Prediction 3: US Data
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(b) Spline estimate of CWP
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Relationship between Competition and Innovation in the Partial Equilibrium



































































































































































Figure 6: Simulation Results from the Partial Equilibrium Industry Model: The three panels on
the left (a, c and e) are meant to replicate the empirical results on the three predictions for the UK



































































































































































Figure 7: Simulation Results from the Partial Equilibrium Industry Model when the Technology
Gap for the Simulated US Industries is Restricted to Two Steps
48